联合国 S/2012/876

安全理事会

Distr.: General
27 November 2012
Chinese
Original: English

2012年11月23日秘书长给安全理事会主席的信

谨随函转递2012年11月13日非洲联盟和平与安全事务专员拉姆丹·拉马姆拉代表非洲联盟委员会主席发出的信(见附件)。本信附文是关于在马里部署一个由非洲领导的国际支助团的统一行动构想，非洲联盟和平与安全理事会2012年11月13日在亚的斯亚贝巴举行的第341次会议核可了该行动构想以及会议公报。*

谨请你提请安全理事会成员注意这封信以及核可的行动构想和非洲联盟和平与安全理事会2012年11月13日会议公报。

潘基文(签名)

* 附文以所收到文本原文分发。

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请回收

2012 年 11 月 23 日秘书长给安全理事会主席的信的附件

我谨代表委员会主席写信给你，此前她曾于 2012 年 10 月 25 日致函，转递和平与安全理事会 2012 年 10 月 24 日的一项公报以及解决马里危机的战略构想。谨请回顾在该信中委员会主席向你转交了关于应马里当局请求在马里部署一支由非洲牵头的部队的《行动构想》，以恢复对该国北部被占领领土的控制，拆除恐怖分子和犯罪网络，并确保在该国领土全面恢复国家权力。

我高兴地通知你，和平与安全理事会于 2012 年 11 月 13 日在亚的斯亚贝巴举行了第 341 次会议，核可了协调统一的《行动构想》，以在马里部署非洲领导的国际支助团；这是西非经共体 2012 年 11 月 11 日在尼日利亚阿布贾举行的国家元首和政府首脑机关特别会议所提建议的。我谨此转递协调统一的《行动构想》、和平与安全理事会公报以及西非经共体特别首脑会议公报。请将本信、和平与安全理事会公报以及《行动构想》转交给安全理事会成员，供其酌情采取行动。

我同意和平与安全理事会公报的看法，注意到解决马里危机的战略构想和《行动构想》提供了联合国安全理事会在其 2012 年 6 月 18 日向新闻界发表的声明及其第 2056(2012)号和第 2071(2012)号决议所要求的具体信息。因此，我们预期联合国安全理事会将全力支持《战略构想》和协调统一的《行动构想》，并根据《联合国宪章》第七章授权部署非洲领导的马里国际支助团，最初为期一年。我们还期望安全理事会按照其维护国际和平与安全的主要责任，授权设立一个支助一揽子计划，由联合国摊款供资，以促进非洲领导的马里国际支助团的迅速部署和行动。

与此同时，非洲联盟和西非经共体将与所有利益攸关方共同努力，致力于组织所需的部队并最后确定计划的部署行动的各方面事宜。还将作出努力，协助为马里国防和安全部队调动必要的支助。还将继续协助马里当局和其他利益攸关方加快制订过渡路线图，并支持同马里所有愿意寻求和平解决危机的反叛团体在国际社会商定的原则基础上进行对话。本着这一精神，目前针对马里伊斯兰捍卫者组织和阿扎瓦德民族解放运动的努力将是朝着正确方向迈出的决定性的一步。我们打算与联合国密切协调我们的努力。

我要借此机会重申，我们赞赏联合国和安全理事会，特别是赞赏其在这一问题上的领导作用，这表现在通过了第 2056(2012)号和第 2071(2012)号决议，我们完全相信安全理事会将借助这两项决议的势头，协助非洲主导的这项努力，应对马里北部继续恶化的局势。

和平与安全专员

拉姆丹·拉马姆拉(签名)

附文一

［原件：英文和法文］

<u>JOINT STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY FORCE AND THE MALIAN DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES TO RESTORE THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF MALI OVER ITS ENTIRE NATIONAL TERRITORY</u>

References

A. Accord-cadre between ECOWAS and Comité National de Redressement de la Démocratie et de la Restauration de l'Etat (CNDRE) dated 6 April 2012.

B. ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council Communiqué, MSC/AHSG/DEC 2/04/12 dated 12 April 2012.

C. Decision of Heads of States and Government of ECOWAS dated 16 April 2012.

D. AU PSC Communiqué /PR/COMM.(CCCXXIII) dated 12 June 2012.

E. UN Security Council Resolution 2056 dated 5 July 2012.

F. Letter from the Interim President of Mali to the UN Secretary-General dated 30 August 2012.

G. Letter from the Interim President of Mali to the ECOWAS Chairman dated 1 September 2012.

H. Letter from the UN Secretary-General to the Interim President of Mali dated 14 September 2012.

I. Letter from the UN Secretary-General on Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP).

J. Letter from ECOWAS Chairman to the Interim President of Mali dated 19 September 2012.

K. Letter from the Interim President of Mali to ECOWAS Chairman dated 23 September 2012.

L. UN Security Council Resolution 2071 dated 12 October 2012.

M. AU PSC Communiqué PSC/MIN/COMM.2 (CCCXXXIX) dated 24 October 2012.

N. AU Strategic Concept for the resolution of the crises in Mali adopted by the by the AUPSC on 24 October 2012.

O. CONOPS for ECOWAS Mission in Mali (MICEMA) dated 30 October 2012.

P. CONOPS for Mali Defence and Security Forces (MDSF).

<u>REVIEW</u>

1. Based on references A to P above, an International Military Force[1] (IMF) comprising a core military force, with appropriate civilian and police elements is to be established as a Mission, with a mandate for twelve months. Progress against the mandate will be reviewed prior to its conclusion to assess any further actions required.

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1 As the Mission will be under the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the requirement for international support, and the need to have civilian and police elements in the mission, suggestions have been made to name the Mission as *Mission Internationale de Soutien au Mali sous conduite Africaine* (MISMA). In English, it could either be African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) or International Support Mission to Mali led by Africa.

SUMMARY OF MISSION CONCEPT

2. The IMF will initially assist in equipping and training the Malian Defense and Security Forces (MDSF). The IMF will also prepare and deploy in the Area of Operations as a supporting force to MDSF to recover the regions in northern Mali. After the MDSF has restored national territorial integrity, the MDSF will transition to stabilisation activities, and the IMF will be redeployed from the theatre of operations.

3. Mali, the core countries[2] and other neighbouring countries, with the support of the international community, will then continue their efforts to consolidate security and stability within the region.

BACKGROUND

Political Framework

4 The Malian crisis requires a comprehensive political solution, based on UNSC Resolutions (2065 and 2071) and the AU strategic concept. In this regard, it is crucial that the Transitional authorities of Mali, the non-terrorist Malian groups and legitimate representatives of the local population in the north of Mali, engage as soon as possible, in a credible negotiation process in order to seek a sustainable political solution, mindful of the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali. The joint action of the IMF and the MDSF, as described in this joint strategic Concept of Operations is designed to contribute to this comprehensive political solution

Environment

5 Northern Mali is an arid area of 937,742 km^2 situated in the Sahel- Sahara region, representing 75 per cent of the total Malian territory. It contains the three regions of Gao, Tombouctou and Kidal, and a population of 1,293,449, representing 10 per cent of the national population. This area is predominantly desert, with some mountainous terrain. It has minimal and irregular rainfall (below 200 mm per year) creating extremely difficult living conditions. Northern Mali shares a 5,000 km border with Algeria, Mauritania, Niger and Burkina Faso.

6 Humanitarian situation. The situation in the western part of the Sahel region – which includes Mali - has deteriorated dramatically during 2012 due to drought and sporadic rains, poor harvests, rising food prices, displacement and insecurity. The humanitarian community is scaling up its response to this crisis, but there are significant funding gaps. Urgent support is needed to ensure that programmes can be implemented to prevent a further deterioration in the humanitarian situation. There are continuing and widespread humanitarian needs in Mali while neighbouring countries are facing an influx of Malian refugees in areas already among the most severely affected by the food and nutrition crisis. An estimated, 19 million

[2] Core countries are Mali, Algeria, Mauritania and Niger.

persons are at risk of food insecurity and malnutrition in the Sahel region, of which some 4.6 million are in Mali. An estimated 204,000 persons are internally displaced in Mali and there are some, 209,000 refugees from Mali in neighbouring countries. It is estimated that 55% of the entire displaced population are women and 3% are children. Operations of most UN and international and national humanitarian Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in northern Mali are currently confined to urban areas due to insecurity in the more remote locations. Limited amounts of assistance are being delivered through local NGOs and civil society organizations. Livelihood and child protection issues remain major challenges. A coordination hub has been established in Mopti to service northern Mali. In the event of military action in Mali, it is expected that at least an additional 200,000 persons will be displaced.

7. **Human rights situation.** The human rights situation in Mali, especially in the North, has deteriorated since January 2012. The crisis has resulted in serious human rights abuses, including war crimes and crimes against humanity that have been perpetrated in the North. Transnational criminal and terrorist groups have reportedly committed gross human rights abuses, including summary and extrajudicial executions, sexual and gender-based violence, recruitment and use of child soldiers, torture, and the looting of hospitals. It is also reported that they are perpetrating violations of economic, social and cultural rights. Many schools in the North were reportedly closed and looted. Furthermore, several UNESCO world heritage sites have been destroyed.

Risk Assessment

a. **Terrorist groups**

8 Religious extremist terrorist groups and international criminal networks currently control Northern Mali. The major movements consist of islamist terrorist, separatist and transnational criminal groups. The Islamist terrorist groups are Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Movement for Unity and Justice in West Africa (MUJWA) and Boko Haram. The Arab Movement for Azawad (AMA) is a transnational criminal group. The strength of the core fighters from various nationalities of all movements is estimated to be between 2,500 and 3,000 coming from Africa, Europe and Asia. Terrorist and affiliated extremist groups now pose a security threat to Mali, the sub-region, and the international community.

9 The above groups engage in terrorism, narcotic and human trafficking, hostage taking (for ransoms), smuggling of arms, drug route protection, currency exchanges and control of local economies. These activities generate income used for arms procurement, insurgency costs, recruitment of new members, spares and supplies and vehicles as well as other ancillary needs. Weapons available to the groups include rifles, heavy weapons, surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft guns, rockets, mortars, light armoured vehicles, mines and IEDs,

10 Currently, the groups are consolidating their positions and control in northern Mali. It is envisaged that these activities will continue, until the Malian government with international support can take appropriate steps, including a political and military approach, to reduce the

threats posed by these groups and restore the territorial integrity of Mali. After the MDSF and IMF operations commence, it is likely that the groups will create strongholds and carry out attacks using asymmetric tactics. The risk of terrorist activities being perpetrated in southern Mali, the sub-region, regionally and internationally is likely to increase.

b. *Other rebel groups*

11 The secessionist groups are the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (NMLA) and Popular Front for Azawad (FPA) as well as Ansar Dine.

Strategic Framework

12. **Political strategic objective.** Within the framework of the political process towards resolving the Malian crisis, restore State authority over the national territory and maintain Mali's national unity.

13 **Political strategic end state.** The security conditions are established for a stable democratic Malian State exercising authority over its national territory and assuming its responsibilities *for the protection of the population*, properties and *livelihood means* and for addressing regional security and human rights challenges, particularly international terrorism and transnational criminal activities.

14. **Military strategic objectives.**

a. Develop the capacity of the MDSF to an appropriate combat readiness level through coordinated support for training, equipping, technical assistance and funding.

b. Develop capacities for the establishment of the IMF through coordinated support by stakeholders for force generation, training, equipping, technical assistance and funding.

c. Restore the territorial integrity of Mali by fighting against the threat of terrorist and affiliated extremist groups in the Sahel region to recover the regions in northern Mali.

d. Reduce the threat of terrorist and affiliated extremist groups in the Sahel region.

e Establish a secure environment for the restoration of authority of the State of Mali over its entire national territory and constitutional order.

f. Establish a secure environment for the provision of basic services and social amenities and the return of the displaced population.

g Support the Malian authorities in their *primarily* responsibility for the *protection* of the population with respect for international human rights and international humanitarian

and refugee law, and with adherence to the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy for the provision of support by the UN to non-UN security forces.

h. Reduce transnational organized crime in the Sahel region, including illicit activities such as drug trafficking.

i. Contribute to the creation of the conditions for transition to stabilisation by the Malian authorities.

15 **Military strategic intent.** While the Malian authorities continue to maintain the integrity of the southern Mali regions, the enduring capabilities and capacities of MDSF are to be enhanced through coordinated IMF and international support, to enable them to conduct offensive and stability operations. At the same time, the IMF is to complete its force generation and resolve capability gaps with international assistance, prepare for joint operations, and deploy to the Area of Operations. Preliminary operations are to be conducted to shape the environment and develop situational awareness, and sufficient logistic arrangements are to be concurrently established to deploy the forces, ensure force protection and support operations. Within the framework of the political process towards resolving the Malian crisis, once both forces are operationally effective, operations are to be conducted by the MDSF, supported by the IMF, to restore the territorial integrity of Mali by fighting against the threat of terrorist and affiliated extremist groups in the Sahel region to recover the northern regions of Mali and support the primary responsibility of the Malian authorities for the protection of the population. After the territorial integrity of Mali is restored, the forces will transition to Malian authority stability operations to maintain security and territorial integrity, and consolidate State authority and constitutional order. The IMF is then to be redeployed to home locations.

16. **Military strategic end state.** The territorial integrity of Mali is restored, with the threats from terrorist and affiliated groups, and transnational criminal activities, reduced. A sufficiently secure environment is maintained by an operationally capable MDSF for the consolidation of State authority, maintenance of territorial integrity and the protection of the population; and the conditions are established for the restoration of basic services, social amenities and the return of the population.

Planning Assumptions

17. The following assumptions have been made in planning.

a. The UN Security Council provides timely authorisation for an IMF.

b. There is no major interruption in the political process towards resolving the Malian crisis.

c. The ECOWAS, in coordination with AU, generates the authorised IMF.

d. AU Member States and international partners mobilise and provide resources to support the IMF and MDSF.

e. Mali and neighbouring countries facilitate and support IMF preparations, deployment, operations and other activities.

f. The IMF and MDSF operate under appropriate levels of readiness and interoperability.

g. Appropriate stocks for logistics support will be prepositioned *prior* to deployment of IMF units.

Constraints and limitations

18. The main constraints and limitations are:

a. Deploy IMF and fill MDSF operational gaps concurrently.

b. To allow hold free and democratic election.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

19. **Theatre of Operations.** The Theatre of Operations comprises the Area of Operations (AO) and the Area of Interest (AI). The AO is defined by the territory of the Republic of Mali, but may also include parts of territories of willing neighbouring and core countries, subject to their agreement and within appropriate legal frameworks. The Area of Interest (AI) includes the territories of the neighbouring countries.

ASSIGNED FORCES

20. **Supported Force.** Five thousand (5,000) MDSF personnel will be involved in the operations to restore the territorial integrity while the rest of MDSF personnel will continue to carry out other security tasks. The operating force conducting the main effort will comprise of eight battle groups, engineers, air assets, logistics, and security agencies. They will require assistance including counter-terrorism, communications, police and special operations, basic and advanced combat skills, mobility and counter mobility skills, Counter-IED (C-IED), fire support, and human rights skills. Basic and specialised equipment will be required for force protection, police operations, C-IED and de-mining operations.

21. **Supporting force.** IMF Thrre thousand and three hundred (3,300) personnel, consisting of the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), reinforced with contributions of *other African countries* and willing partners. The IMF will comprise of four (04) infantry battalions, engineers, fire support, air assets, logistics and formed police units[3]. The IMF requires the additional generation of special forces, air support assets (combat and utility aircraft and logistic air

3 Agreement has been reached for at least two FPUs.

transport], additional fire support capabilities, intelligence, and CIED equipment and training. Some basic and specialised training and equipment will also need to be sourced.

22. **Potential International Contributions.** Other countries, including Mali's neighbours, may provide support to both forces including intelligence, logistics and troops to ensure the successful conduct of the joint operation. In addition, international partners, according to their expressed commitments, will provide funding, trainers and requested logistic and operational support.

<u>MISSION</u>

23. The MDSF, supported by the IMF and with international assistance will, for the mandate period of twelve months[4], develop necessary capabilities and recover the occupied regions in the north of Mali, in order to contribute to the creation of the necessary conditions for a stable, democratic Malian State exercising authority over its national territory and assuming its responsibilities in the protection of the population, properties and livelihood means, and addressing regional security challenges, particularly international terrorism and transnational criminal activities.

<u>EXECUTION</u>

Concept of Operations

24. The operation will be conducted in three phases, some of which may overlap.

a. Phase 1, Deployment and Training. (M[5] to M+180)

(1) The IMF headquarters will be established as soon as possible in Mali to conduct detailed joint planning with the MDSF.

(2) The MDSF will continue independent security operations to maintain security and the territorial integrity of the southern regions of Mali and will prepare displaced security forces for recommencement of their responsibilities in northern Mali.

(3) The IMF and international partners will train, equip and provide technical assistance to the MDSF to enhance its operational effectiveness for joint operations to recover, and subsequently maintain control, of the northern regions of Mali.

(4) The ECOWAS, in consultation with AU, and with international support, will facilitate the completion of generation of the necessary capabilities for the

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4 The mandate for IMF will initially be for twelve months, but may be reconsidered through review.

5 The mission will commence at "M", which is the date of authorisation of the mandate by the UN Security Council.

deployment of IMF to Mali, including forces, training, equipment and technical assistance.

(5) Logistics support arrangements, initial basing, communications and operational stocks will be established.

(6) Preliminary operations will be conducted to shape the operational environment and to develop situational awareness. This will include a comprehensive information campaign through the AU, ECOWAS and Mali, based on an agreed, coordinated strategic communications strategy.

(7) The operation will also take into consideration humanitarian issues and human rights in the concerned areas.

(8) **Main effort.** Resolve training and capability needs, and develop logistic support.

b. Phase 2. Restoration of territorial integrity. (M+180 - *or sooner if MDSF are ready* - to M+300)

(1) MDSF, supported by IMF and with international assistance, will conduct operations to recover the northern regions in order to restore its national territorial integrity and reduce the terrorist threat.

(2) IMF will assist the Malian authorities in their primarily responsibility for the *protection of the population*.

(3) Enhancing of MDSF capabilities, particularly for security and policing, will continue.

(4) **Main effort.** MDSF operations to recover the northern regions of Mali.

c. Phase 3. Transition to *Government of Mali* stabilisation operations and programmes. (M+270 to M+360)

(1) The MDSF will transition to stabilisation activities by the Malian authorities to maintain security and territorial integrity, and consolidate State authority and constitutional order.

(2) The IMF, after handover, will redeploy to *home locations*.

(3) The Malian authorities, with neighbouring and core countries, and the support of the international community, will continue to work to maintain stability in the Sahel.

(4) **Main effort.** Transition to stabilisation activities by the Malian authorities.

Police Concept of Operations

25. The Police element of the Mission, with the support of the international community, will *first* reinforce the Centre de Coordination des Opérations de Sécurisation des Institutions de la Transition[6] (CCOSIT), while deploying its Formed Police Units (FPUs) in the protection of IMF property and personnel. The Police element will subsequently assist in training and providing logistic support to the MDSF Police and security agencies.

26. As the MDSF stabilizes the regained areas and prepares to deploy in further areas of the northern regions, the Police element, when requested, could support MDSF Police and security agencies to resume their responsibilities for the establishment and maintenance of law and order and public safety. Assistance may also consist of addressing gaps identified with regard to security threats to the restoration of State authority and the protection of the population with respect for international human rights and international humanitarian and refugee law.

27. Support to Security Sector Reform. The Mission should support the overall goal of rebuilding a functional Malian security sector that can effectively play its cardinal role in the restoration of the territorial integrity of Mali under democratic control and oversight. With the aim of reinforcing a coordinated and cohesive approach between all national, sub-regional, regional and international actors, the Mission management structure should include from its *commencement* a *Security Sector Reform Advisory* Team, which would pursue three main objectives:

a. Provide an interface and point of contact with the Malian national institutions responsible for SSR, to ensure coherence of short-term actions with the longer-term national framework.

b. In a coordinated manner, assist Malian authorities to urgently conduct a comprehensive security sector mapping ('Etat des Lieux') of the Malian security sector, in accordance with UN principles.

c. Facilitate cooperation and division of labour between international actors and the Government of Mali in the short-term provision of training and capacity building for the purpose of restoring the territorial integrity of northern Mali.

Concept of support

28. Logistic support will be provided down to battalion/unit level for all operational phases. A main logistics base, holding and maintaining the strategic reserve stocks and providing central services, will initially be established in a forward location in Mali in the vicinity of the initial locations of force headquarters, and will stage forward as operations progress. If required, additional logistics bases will be established within the theatre of operations.

6 The CCOSIT is the Malian coordination centre responsible for the security activities of the institutions of the Malian political transition.

Mobile, tactical, Forward Logistic Bases (FLB) will be established in the vicinity of the forward locations of forces, and will follow the axes of advance and operational tempo. Second line force logistic assets will distribute from the FLBs to the units.

29. Each FLB will require medical, maintenance, supply, a Communication and Information Technology System (CITS), Petrol Oils and Lubricants (POL) and engineering services through a combination of mission staff and contractors. The FLBs will hold an appropriate level of reserve stocks of fuel, water, rations, ammunition, general supplies and maintenance equipment to ensure continuity of operations and a sustainable supply chain.

30. The primary means of delivery of goods to the logistic hub(s) will be through road convoys, or intra theatre air assets as required, utilizing the forces' logistics units supplemented, as needed, by contracted vendors on the second and third lines of supply.

31. IMF units will primarily be deployed to the AO by strategic lift under contract or bilateral arrangements. Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) will be deployed by contracted or bilateral air, sea, rail and road transport through the main point of entry, or the most direct route(s) to the AO. Units will initially need to be self-sufficient on deployment for a period of 30 days, after which support will be provided.

32. Units are to deploy with a minimum of a Level I medical capability, containing at least two Forward Medical Teams (FMTs). Level II medical facilities will be provided within the AO, and MEDEVAC to Level III and IV facilities in the region. Force air assets, supplemented if necessary by contract, will conduct CASEVAC.

33. Support Costs. Support costs are yet to be finalised.

COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

34. Timings. The mission will commence at "M", which is the date of authorisation of the mandate by the UN Security Council.

35. Further planning. It will be essential to retain a skeleton of the planning elements of ECOWAS and AU in Bamako to continue to refine planning documents, with support of the UN and partners where appropriate. These planning efforts should also take into account the need to lay a firm foundation for follow-on post-conflict interventions by Mali and the international community.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

36. Strategic level. The ECOWAS, in consultation with AU, will appoint a Special Representative who will provide political and strategic oversight and serve as the Head of Mission. Since the Mission is primarily military in function, the Special Representative will have a lean Mission Headquarters with the experienced staff necessary to assist in providing strategic guidance to the military component, civilian and police elements, and to coordinate with the Malian authorities. Advisors may include political, humanitarian, human rights, SSR, military, police and legal officers. The Special Representative will receive strategic guidance from ECOWAS in

coordination with the AU, and in accordance with the UN Security Council mandate. Under the mandate, the UN Secretary-General would provide strategic advice on the management of IMF. It is recommended that, in line with the spirit of the Protocol relating to the establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council, the development of the management structure should be guided by the principles of proximity, *subsidiarity*, comparative advantage and mutual accountability, as well as the unique context in Mali.

37. The ECOWAS and AU will establish a bi-level Joint Coordination Mechanism (JCM) to provide strategic guidance and assistance to the IMF. The JCM will comprise of the Defence Ministers of Mali, Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), core countries and interested parties. Chiefs of Defence Staff of JCM Member States will form a technical advisory working group to the JCM.

38. Mission level coordination. The Special Representative will have regular contact with appropriate Malian authorities in the implementation of the mission mandate. Stakeholders providing support to the mission will, in consultation with the Special Representative, coordinate their activities in a Partners Coordination Forum (PCF), to facilitate the implementation of their support. The UN and partners would participate in the JCM when deemed necessary and appropriate. Partners will also have coordination arrangements at the operational level to enable liaison and coordination of support provided to the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) or Joint Planning and Coordination Centre (JPCC) of the forces.

39. Command and Control of Assigned Forces. The MDSF and IMF forces will have separate commanders reporting to the Malian Joint Chief of Staff and the Special Representative respectively. The staff of the Force Headquarters IMF and the MDSF will be integrated in a Joint Planning and Coordination Centre (JPCC). The JPCC shown as appendix 1 will compose of a Joint Operation Centre (JOC), Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC), Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC), Joint CIS Cell, Joint Training Cell, Joint Engineering Cell and Joint Air Operations Centre; that will provide instructions and orders to the two forces. JPCC will be co-headed, receive guidance from the respective Force Commanders, and provide priorities and guidance to the joint staff. Liaison Officers will facilitate coordination at the tactical level. The adopted command and control structure is at Annex A.

Annex

A Adopted Command and Control Structure.

ANNEX A TO
IMF AND MDSF JOINT CONOPS

OPTION 1



ANNEX A TO
IMF AND MDSF JOINT CONOPS

JOINT PLANNING AND COORDINATION CENTRE

Option 1



Colonel – major Ibrahim D DEMBELE

Malian Chief and Defence Staff

General Corps d'Armee Soumaila BAKAYOKO

ECOWAS Chairman, Committee, Chiefs of Defence Staff

附文二

［原件：英文和法文］

COMMUNIQUÉ

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 341st meeting held on 13 November 2012, adopted the following decision on the situation in Mali:

Council,

1. **Takes note** of the briefing provided by the Commissioner for Peace and Security on the follow-up to communiqué PSC/MIN/COMM.2(CCCXXXIX) on the situation in Mali, adopted by the 339th meeting of Council, held at the ministerial level on 24 October 2012, particularly regarding the joint planning for the deployment of an African-led international force in Mali. Council **also takes note** of the statements made by Mali, the Special Representative of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Mali, the Chairman of the Committee of the Chiefs of Defense Staff of ECOWAS, Burkina Faso, in its capacity as ECOWAS Mediator in the crisis in Mali, and Algeria, as well as by China, France, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union (EU), and the United Nations;

2. **Recalls** its previous communiqués on the situation in Mali and **reaffirms its unwavering commitment** to the national unity and territorial integrity of Mali, as well as its total rejection of terrorism and armed rebellion as a means of furthering political claims;

3. **Reiterates its appreciation** to Presidents Yayi Boni of Benin, Current Chairman of the African Union, Alassane Dramane Ouattara of Côte d'Ivoire, Current Chairman of ECOWAS, Blaise Compaoré of Faso, ECOWAS Mediator, Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, Associate Mediator, and other regional leaders, as well as to the President of the ECOWAS Commission, Kadré Désiré Ouédraogo, for their efforts to help Mali overcome the challenges facing it. Council **welcomes** the efforts deployed by President Alpha Condé of the Republic of Guinea to facilitate the transfer of the Malian arms that arrived in the port of Conakry, and **encourages him** to take the required additional measures to ensure their speedy and safe transfer to the Malian authorities. Council **reiterates its appreciation** to the core countries for their contribution and continuous commitment to fight against terrorism and transnational organised crime. Council **expresses, once again, its gratitude** to the United Nations Security Council for the support extended to Africa's efforts, particularly through resolutions 2056 (2012) and 2071 (2012), adopted, respectively, on 5 July and 12 October 2012, as well as to the EU and bilateral partners for their support;

4. **Welcomes** the smooth conduct of the Planning Conference held in Bamako, Mali, from 30 October to 4 November 2012, with the participation of experts from Mali, ECOWAS, the core countries, the AU, the UN, the EU and other bilateral partners, as well as the conclusions and recommendations of the meeting of the Committee of the Chiefs of Defense Staff of ECOWAS, which took place in Bamako on 6 November 2012;

5. **Also welcomes** the final communiqué of the Extraordinary Session of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, held in Abuja, Nigeria, on 11 November 2012, at

which the Authority decided to adopt the harmonised Concept of Operations for the deployment of an African-led international Force in Mali, called "African-led International Support Mission to Mali" (AFISMA), and requested the AU Peace and Security Council to endorse the said Concept and ensure its immediate transmission, together with the Strategic Concept for the Resolution of the Crises in Mali, adopted by the 339th meeting of Council, to the UN Secretary-General, within the time limit prescribed by resolution 2071 (2012). In this regard, Council **takes note of** the transmission by the Chairperson of the Commission to the UN Secretary-General, by letter dated 25 October 2012, of the Strategic Concept for the Resolution of the Crises in Mali, and **recalls** paragraph 9 of its communiqué PSC/MIN/COMM.2(CCCXXXIX), by which Council decided that the Concept of Operations for the planned deployment in Mali would be transmitted to the UN Secretary-General by 15 November 2012;

6. **Notes with satisfaction** that the Concept of Operations, as endorsed by ECOWAS, takes into account, as requested in paragraph 10 of communiqué PSC/MIN/Comm.2 (CCCXXXIX), the contributions which may be made, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council and the relevant decisions of Council and the Assembly of the Union, by other African countries, including the neighbours of Mali, in terms of intelligence, logistics and troops, and aims at building the operational capacities of the Malian Defense and Security Forces, to enable them play a lead role in the recovery of the regions in the north that are at present occupied by armed, terrorist and criminal groups, as well as the execution of related tasks;

7. **Decides,** in the light of the foregoing, to endorse the harmonised Concept of Operations for the planned deployment of AFISMA, and **stresses** that this deployment falls within the framework of the African Standby Force, as provided for in Article 13 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, and aims at responding to the request of the Malian authorities to regain the occupied regions in the north of the country, dismantle the terrorist and criminal networks and restore effectively the authority of the State over the entire national territory. In this regard, Council **notes with satisfaction** the decision of ECOWAS to maintain its standby brigade in advanced readiness for an imminent deployment;

8. **Requests** the Chairperson of the Commission to transmit immediately the harmonised Concept of Operations to the UN Secretary-General, **looking forward** to the report he will be submitting in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 2071 (2012);

9. **Notes** that the Strategic Concept for the Resolution of the Crises in Mali and the harmonized Concept of Operations provide the specific information requested by the UN Security Council, in its press statement of 18 June 2012 and resolutions 2056 (2012) and 2071 (2012), on the objectives, the ways, means and modalities of the planned deployment and other possible measures. Consequently, Council **urges** the UN Security Council to give its full support to the Strategic Concept and the harmonised Concept of Operations and to authorise, for an initial period of one year, the planned deployment of AFISMA, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Council, recalling paragraph 17 of communiqué PSC/PR/ COMM. (CCCXXIII), adopted at its 323rd meeting, held in New York, on 12 June 2012, **also urges** the

Security Council to authorise the establishment of a support package funded by the United Nations assessed contributions, in order to facilitate the speedy deployment and operations of MISMA;

10. **Requests** the Chairperson of Commission, within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture, to immediately initiate consultations with ECOWAS on the command and control of AFISMA, particularly the appointment of the main officials of the Mission, including the Special Representative, and the necessary coordination mechanisms with ECOWAS and other concerned stakeholders, to ensure an effective deployment and functioning of AFISMA. Council **requests** that these consultations be expedited within two (2) weeks from the date of this communiqué;

11. **Also requests** the Chairperson of the Commission, in consultation with ECOWAS to take the necessary measures for the generation of forces for AFISMA. Furthermore, Council **request**s the Chairperson of the Commission, in close consultation with ECOWAS, the EU and the UN, to contribute actively to the mobilization of adequate support for the Malian Defense and Security Forces, especially through the speedy organisation of a donors' conference. Council **reiterates its appeal** to the international community, including regional and international organisations, to give the necessary support to the Malian Defense and Security Forces, in conformity with the relevant provisions of resolution 2071 (2012), and **urges** the UN Security Council to establish a Trust Fund to this effect;

12. **Urges all** African States, including the countries of the region, the core countries and the other immediate neighbors of Mali, to contribute to the success of the planned operation, particularly through financial, logistical, technical, intelligence and troop contributions, as appropriate;

13. **Reiterates** the terms of paragraph 8 of its communiqué PSC/MIN/Comm.2(CCCXXXIX) on the need for the Malian authorities, prior to the submission by the UN Secretary-General of the report requested by the UN Security Council in paragraph 7 of resolution 2071 (2012), to take a number of measures, in order to enhance efforts aimed at resolving the crises in Mali, including: (a) the preparation, in consultation with ECOWAS and the AU, and with the support of the UN and other international partners, through broad-based national consultations, a detailed roadmap, with concrete steps and timelines, on the implementation of the two main transitional tasks; and (b) the establishment, as soon as possible, of the planned national structure to negotiate with the Malian armed groups in the north that are ready to enter into dialogue in order to find a political solution to the crisis, on the basis of the strict respect of the national unity and territorial integrity of Mali, rejection of terrorism and transnational organised crime, as well as armed rebellion, it being understood that negotiations cannot be open-ended;

14. **Takes note** of the statement made by the Interim President of the Republic of Mali confirming that the Roadmap for the Transition will be available in the next few days and

stresses, once again, the crucial importance of the consensual and inclusive preparation of this Roadmap for the mobilisation of the international community to support Mali;

15. **Endorses** the decision of ECOWAS that neither the Interim President nor the Prime Minister and other members of the Transitional Government can be candidates for the next presidential elections;

16. **Encourages, once again,** the core countries to intensify their efforts to combat terrorist and criminal networks, in particular through the Fusion and Liaison Unit (UFL) and the Joint Operational Chief of Staff Committee (CEMOC), and **calls for** a closer coordination between them and the other neighbours of Mali;

17. **Appeals** for increased regional and international support, so as to meet the immediate humanitarian needs in the north of Mali and in the neighboring countries hosting Malian refugees;

18. **Welcomes** the action already taken by the AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, former President Pierre Buyoya, in the fulfillment of his mandate, including his participation in the Extraordinary Summit of ECOWAS of 11 November 2012 and his current tour in the countries of the region;

19. **Requests** the Chairperson of the Commission to organize as soon as possible, in consultation with ECOWAS and the United Nations, a meeting of the Support and Follow-up Group, immediately after the submission by the UN Secretary General of the report requested under paragraph 7 of resolution 2071 (2012), in order to take stock of the evolution of the situation and further mobilize the international community in support of Africa's efforts;

20. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.